even though f-worlds may be counterfactual. This follows from the fact that, in order to be felicitous, quantified sentences require that the restriction of the quantifier not be empty: e.g., (6) requires that there be boys in the domain of quantification (cf. von Fintel 1994 and Beaver 1995 , 2001 . Similarly for (2): the constraint on the necessity operator is that there must be some (maximally similar, accessible) f-worlds. However, this presupposition must not be bound by the universal quantifier over times, because if it were, it would follow that there must be worlds accessible at all subintervals, including the utterance time (t c ), and we would incorrectly predict that the antecedent must be metaphysically possible at the utterance time (cf. the felicity of (2) in a context where it is known that Jack is dead). This is precisely what we find in inverse-linking sentences like (7).What this sentence presupposes is not that every boy has some friend (as it would, if the presupposition of the LF-lower quantifier every friend were bound by the LF-higher quantifier every boy), but only that some boys have friends. Similarly, in (5), the presupposition will be that at some subinterval t 2 there are (maximally similar, accessible) f-worlds. Let us now consider point (b), i.e. the presuppositions of the antecedent (if any) must hold not only in the hypothetical f-worlds, but also in the actual world. Again, the parallel with other quantified sentences holds. If there is a presupposition in the nuclear scope of the universal quantifier, the presupposition must be satisfied by every member in the domain: (8) is felicitous only if every nation in the domain has a king. Again, the same holds for the subjunctive conditional whose truthconditions are given in (5): the presupposition in the nuclear scope of the universal quantifiers over times will have to be satisfied by every subinterval. Now, the presuppositions in the nuclear scope of the " over times (if any) will be the presuppositions of the embedded conditionals (i.e. f's presuppositions and y's presuppositions that are not entailed by f). Therefore, every subinterval t 2 quantified over by the universal quantifier over times must be such that the antecedent's presuppositions (if any) and the consequent's presuppositions (not entailed by the antecedent) must hold at t 2 . I will also show how this proposal accounts for the contrast between (3) and (4).
To sum up, I have argued that the puzzle of subjunctive conditionals is reducible to the phenomenon of presupposition projection in non-modal quantified sentences, once we unveil the quantification over times hidden in non-indicative modal sentences. Examples (1) #If Jack is alive we are doomed.
(2) If Jack were alive, we would be doomed.
(3) #If Jack quit smoking next summer, he would lose the marathon. (4) If Jack had quit smoking next summer, he would have lost the marathon.
(5) [[If Jack quit smoking next summer, he would lose the marathon]] c = 1 iff $t 3 :
RB(t c , t 3 ) & "t 2 Õt 3 ["w [w is metaphysically accessible from w c at t 2 and Jack will quit smoking next summer is true at t 2 in w and w resembles w c no less than any other world where Jack will quit smoking next summer AE he will lose the marathon is true at t 2 in w] (6) Every boy passed the test. (7) Every friend of every boy passed the test. (8) Every nation i cherishes its i king.
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